










Taxable income responses to tax changes 










The elasticity of taxable income indicates the effects on income from a change 
in the marginal tax rate. In a number of studies on U.S. data rather strong 
effects have been found, although estimates seem lower in more recent papers. 
Studies based on data from other countries are only a few and indicate lower 
effects. A difference-in-differences approach utilising differences in tax 
changes is the standard approach for analysis. Here a large Swedish tax 
reform is employed. Estimated effects of a tax cut are modest, in the interval 
0.2 to 0.4 at the most. Problems of income variables and income groups for the 
analysis are extensively examined. According to an extended model there is a 
positive income effect of the tax change, implying a difference between the 
compensated and the uncompensated elasticity, contrary to earlier results for 
the U. S.   
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1.   Introduction 
 
Large reforms in the taxation of personal income took place in many 
countries during the nineteen-eighties and the beginning of the nineties. 
Main features of these reforms were substantially lowered marginal tax 
rates and broadened tax bases. Supply-side arguments paved the way for 
the reforms. Influential economists argued that the marginal rates, generally 
considered as (very) high, hampered economic activity and resulted in large 
deadweight losses; some even feared that the marginal rates reduced public 
revenue.  
By 1980 marginal tax rates in Sweden had reached a peak of over 85 
percent for those with high income and no deductions; interest payments 
where to a large extent deductible, however. In a series of rate changes 
1982 to 1985, marginal rates were reduced, but during the following years 
taxes again increased. The need for a simpler and more consistent system 
for income and assets’ taxation was generally recognised. Other rationales 
for the large 1990-1991 Swedish reforms with large cuts in tax rates were 
to promote growth while retaining, or creating, a ”fair” distribution of 
income. Tax avoidance should become more difficult and tax evasion less 
tempting. The reform was not fully financed, but in the light of recent 
labour supply analyses at the time, there was a belief that the lower tax 
rates would increase the total number of working hours and sustain tax 
revenue. 
The effects of the tax reforms of the past decades have been analysed in 
a large number of studies for different countries. Labour supply has been in 
focus, but the analysis has been somewhat controversial. A general conclu-
sion emerging though is that effects on the number of working hours for 
males working full-time are difficult to establish, while effects for 
(married) women seem to exist, implying an increase in the number of their 
working hours
1. 
                                                            
1 Swedish studies of labour supply mainly indicate small effects for men. In earlier 
studies income elasticities, regarding the effect on labour supply of a change in income, 
are estimated in the interval -0.1 to 0.0 for married men 25-55 years of age, and -.24 to -
.03 for women. Compensated wage rate elasticities are concentrated around 0.10 for 
men and estimated from 0.22 to 1.07 for women (see the summaries in Agell et al. 1995 
and Klevmarken 2000). Most studies are based on cross-section pre-reform data, but 
panel analyses also indicate small effects for men (Ackum Agell and Meghir 1995, 
Klevmarken 2000). The latter, using pre- and post-reform panel data, finds a positive 





From the mid-nineties there has been a renewed and growing interest in the 
effects of changes of marginal rates on individual income. The elasticity of 
taxable income with respect to the net of tax rate (one minus the marginal 
tax rate) has come into focus. Reasons for this interest in the change in 
taxable income for a small change in the marginal net of tax rate, the per-
centage change by some referred to as the tax-price elasticity, are several.  
First, one has recognised that the traditional measure on labour supply, 
the number of hours worked and it’s change, does not capture all dimen-
sions of the work effort. Not included is, responses regarding the intensity 
of the work effort and the assumption of risk and responsibility, for 
example. Changes of job or job location are not considered, neither is the 
on-the-job acquisition of skills nor the amount of travel.  
A second important reason to consider taxable income, partly as a 
complement to labour supply, is the difficulties to measure the number of 
working hours with good precision. The usual approach by means of 
retrospective survey questions concerning the preceding year implies 
questions no doubt difficult to answer for many individuals, at least as 
regards temporary variations and the timing of a permanent change. In the 
distribution of answers, spikes are usually found for standard working time, 
in Sweden 40 hours per week; many respondents state 40 hours for 52 
weeks in the household income survey. Still, for a considerable number of 
individuals re-interview studies have revealed large variability in answers, 
indicating reliability problems for retrospective surveys covering longer 
time spans.  
These problems are detrimental to measurements of hourly earnings, an 
important explanatory variable for labour supply analysis. For Swedish 
data it is found that there are large errors in hourly earnings as obtained 
from yearly earnings even when the latter are obtained from reliable 
register data. Errors for adjacent years are correlated and measurement 
errors are larger for women than for men (Selén 1995). Working hours 
from employer records have smaller errors, but then there are difficulties 
covering all jobs of an individual with more than one employer. Generally 
there are difficulties knowing hourly earnings on the marginal and sepa-
rating voluntary from ordered overtime. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
et al. (2001) find a net increase of about 2 percent in the average desired hours of work 
for married prime-aged males. This is for a new non-parametrical approach and 
comparing the 1980 system with 1991, or the year with historical high marginal tax 





An important motive in the literature to consider taxable income is con-
siderations of the distorting effects of income taxation. This is partly based 
on the presumption that since labour supply elasticities seem so small there 
must be other responses not covered. Taxable income is a wider concept 
than quantitative labour supply, reflecting not only the number of working 
hours but work compensation more generally and also, at least partly, other 
income sources. Responses to changes in taxation may therefore turn up in 
taxable income although they do not appear in the number of working 
hours.  
Generally individuals have different options responding to taxation. 
Legal responses involve timing of transactions, financial and accounting 
decisions in addition to responses concerning labour supply and savings. 
Avoidance efforts are incorporated by Feldstein (1999), arguing that 
(greater) deadweight losses then are more appropriately accounted for, and 
by Slemrod (2001) clarifying the relationship between avoidance efforts 
and real responses in a simple model.  
While not including all response to income taxation, changes in taxable 
income summarise no doubt the marginal efficiency cost of taxation better 
than changes in a narrower measure such as labour supply or saving 
behaviour. In the literature one has also stressed that the size of the taxable 
income elasticity is helpful for determining the social marginal cost per unit 
revenue raised by the tax system for personal income, and thus is of 
importance in determining the optimal tax mix and the size of the public 
sector.  
Pioneering studies for taxable income analysis are Lindsay (1987) using 
cross-section data and Feldstein (1995) using panel data, a practice which 
thereafter almost all have followed. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996), Slemrod 
(1998) and Triest (1998) concentrate on methodological issues. Slemrod 
and Kopczuk (2002), Saez (2000) and Gruber and Saez (2002) are 
concerned with questions on an optimal elasticity and optimal systems for 
re-distributional preferences respectively. Gruber and Saez (2002) 
summarise the results of estimated taxable income elasticities, from a 
number of studies of the U.S. tax reforms of 1981, 1986 or 1993.  
The first studies indicated rather high taxable income elasticities. 
Lindsay (1987) obtains 1.05 to 2.75, with 1.6 as the central estimate, and 
Feldstein (1995) 1.1 to 3.05 for panel data, but with rather few high-income 
earners. For an extended income measure, adjusted gross income, Feldstein 
obtains an elasticity around 1. In the light of following studies, these esti-





More elaborate regression modelling with efforts to control for effects of 
transient income (mean reversion) or the development of the income 
distribution over time, indicate estimates below 1 for most studies. Auten 
and Carrol (1999) obtain 0.75 (standard error 0.22), Carroll (1998) 0.5 and 
Saez (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002) 0.4 (standard error 0.11). 
Elasticities for adjusted gross income are a bit lower, 0.25 for Saez, from 0 
to 2 for Moffitt and Wilhelm (1998) and close to 0 for Sammartino and 
Wiener (1997), the latter with no controls for mean reversion.  
All these studies are based on panel data but there are differences which 
individuals to include in the estimation, especially as regards the lower 
parts of the income distribution, and the reforms studied are different. For 
the longer period of 1922 to 1989, basing the analysis on aggregate data 
from tax statistics’ tables, Goolsbee (1999) obtains taxable income elasti-
cities from -1.3 to 2 analysing a variety of tax reforms. 
Recent studies of taxable income responses on data other than American 
are difficult to find. An exception is Aarbu and Thoresen (2001), 
examining the Norwegian tax reform of 1992 with substantial reductions in 
tax rates for those with high income. Their elasticity estimates range from -
.6 to .2. The Canadian tax reform of 1988 flattened the personal income tax 
schedule; Sillamaa and Veall (2001) utilising this reform, obtain a main 
elasticity estimate of about 0.25. In both these studies, estimates are lower 
than similar estimates for U.S. data. 
In this paper the large Swedish 1990-1991 reform provides the ‘natural 
experiment’ used in the analysis. Thus a difference-in-differences approach 
comparing pre- and post reform income for individuals is employed. The 
approach is more generally discussed in section 2. A statistical model is 
introduced in section 3, a model which then is linked to the income supply 
model by Gruber and Saez (2002). Some basic estimation problems are 
introduced before the Swedish income tax system is presented briefly in 
section 4, with emphasis on the reform 1990-1991. Two panels of data 
employed are introduced in section 5.  
Estimation and results are presented in detail in sections 6 and 7. In the 
estimation, basically, changes in income are compared for individuals 
affected differently by the reform. Estimation is introduced with Feldstein’s 
tabular approach, but the emphasis is on instrumental variables estimation 
for various groups and selection of individuals as well as for different 
instruments. Effects for broader and narrower income concept are 
compared. The estimated effects are typically modest, and the findings are 





2.   The procedure 
 
The analysis here is based on panel data. According to a classical before-
after approach, and the procedure by now established for the analysis of 
taxable income responses, the outcome -income and tax rate- after a tax 
reform is compared to a pre-reform outcome. The changes in outcome are 
then compared for individuals treated differently by the reform. Thus, we 
are considering differences in changes, but the procedure is usually known 
as one of differences in differences. 
A main difficulty in identifying the effects of a tax reform is that 
individuals with similar characteristics are treated similarly by the fiscal 
system. Those in the same income bracket are exposed to the same tax 
change, especially when taxation is purely individual. The variation in 
”treatment” by the reform is between individuals in different original tax 
brackets. Since effects may be identified by a comparison of individuals 
treated differently, one usually compares the changes for individuals in 
different income classes who are also different in other ways and probably 
also behave differently. Unfortunately, most recent tax reforms leave little 
choice, with large changes in marginal rates for those with high income and 
smaller changes for the rest. 
Therefore, the situation is very different from an experiment, where the 
assignment of individuals to groups treated differently is random, leaving 
no systematic a priori differences between these groups. Here we have to 
rely on assumptions instead, loosely speaking assumptions of response 
similarity for individuals in different tax brackets if they were to experience 
a similar change. Such assumptions are critical for unbiased estimation of 
effects and if individuals in different income classes have different attitudes 
to changes in marginal tax rates, for example, then the analysis is in 
jeopardy.  
A second possibility for identification of tax rate effects is differences in 
local tax rates, which could be used alternatively to or in conjunction with 
pre and post tax reform data. The assumption of response similarity then 
concerns different municipalities rather than different income classes. 
While there are different local or municipal tax rates in Sweden, a main 
problem with this alternative here is that many communities with higher 
municipal rates are small and have economic difficulties. The labour 
market is different in many of these communities as compared to other 
communities, and it is likely that the probability to increase labour income 





the comparison of different income classes, giving some attention to 
differences in rates between communities. 
There are several other problems, which we need to consider in the 
analysis, among these the implications of different income concepts; there 
is not always a single taxable income and broader as well as narrower 
income measures may be interesting.  
Changes in tax bases according to a reform, is a complication, since a 
straightforward estimation then concerns a mixture of elasticities: those of 
changes in rates and those of changes in the tax base.  
Inflation may further be of importance for differences over time, an 
individual’s positive change in current prices may turn up as a negative 
change in constant prices.  
The sampling procedure in income surveys is often somewhat 
complicated, especially if those with very high income and large tax rate 
changes are to be included to a reasonable extent in the survey.  
Mean reversion effects may disturb estimation, for example if some 
individuals ”by chance” get a high income the first year but not the second, 
independently of their behavioural response to the tax reform.  
Changes in the income distribution, for instance in the form of a secular 
trend independently of the reform, raise further problems as well as the 
influence of factors other than tax factors. 
 
 
3.   Taxable income effects 
 
A statistical model written for individual i at time period t is 
 
yit = β  zit + α i + τ it + ν it,                 ( 1 )  
 
where y denotes the outcome or the response, usually taxable income in our 
case, and z the stimulus-related net of tax rate (NTR). The latter equals one 
minus the marginal tax rate or 1-v. The variables y and z are either linear or 
logarithmically transformed. β  denotes the effect parameter, α i is an indivi-
dual intercept and τ it an individual time effect. The latter may be composed 
of a common time specific effect and of individual characteristics constant 
over time, but whose relationships to income changes over time, for 
example  
 






where Xi is the vector of individual characteristics and β t a coefficient 
vector. The error term ν it in (1) is symmetrically and independently 
distributed by assumption. 
The post-reform pre-reform difference dyi = yit2 - yit1 is written 
 
 dyi = β  dzi  + dτ i  + dν i  ,                 ( 2 )  
 
as we subtract (1) for time period t1  from (1) for time period t2 (t2>t1) and 
ignore the period index. The individual parameters α i cancel out. A tax 
reform with different changes for different income ”classes” provides a 
natural experiment, where in contrast to a true experiment yit  and zit are 
determined jointly by the individual, although the tax schedule is decided 
by parliament and by local assemblies.  
Model (2) is a regression model where dzi is endogenous and dτ i is 
unknown. Let us, for a moment, assume that (2) applies to two groups 
treated differently in the reform, each group consisting of identical 
individuals. Say that the groups differ by income and are indexed by the 
superscripts H and L for those with high income and low income, 
respectively. The difference between the post-reform pre-reform 














L = 0, a consistent estimator of the effect parameter β  is 
 
 b = [dy
H - dy
L ] / [dz
H-dz




L are based on averages and we relax the assumption of 
identical individuals within the groups, this is the type of estimator 
introduced by Feldstein (1995). The actual estimate in a finite sample is 
dependent on how the averages are calculated, here has different 
alternatives been tried, giving taxable income elasticities directly or after 
some transformation. 
In a regression framework it is realised that (4) is obtained if 
instrumental variables are used for the estimation of (2) with a dummy 
variable defining the two groups as the instrument, that is a variable with 
values 1 for group H and -1 for group L.  
For the estimator (4), we assumed that the comparison of the groups was 
perfect in the sense that the difference dτ
H-dτ
L was zero. Such an assump-
tion is often questionable in practice, which means a large sample bias, 
 










The sign of the bias depends on the sign of the numerator, given a typical 
tax reform. For a tax cut favouring the rich, an underlying trend of in-
creasing income inequality would induce a positive bias. A transient com-
ponent in income is likely to attenuate any effect. The component dτ
H-dτ
L 
is the challenging difficulty in the estimation and there are a number of 
reasons why this component may exist but so difficult to adequately 
indicate and handle. Among the reasons are mean reversion and different 
properties and attitudes of the groups we try to compare in the quasi-
experiment offered by the tax reform.  
An income supply model in a microeconomic framework with two 
goods, consumption and income, derived by Gruber and Saez (2002), 
allows us an interesting interpretation and a specification of the dτ -terms. 
The model is obtained as follows letting, as before, y and z denote income 
and net of tax rate respectively. The budget constraint following from a 
standard income tax system is piecewise linear and written w = y (1-v) + r, 
where w is consumption on a linear segment, r denotes virtual income and 
v is the marginal tax rate (z=1-v). 
For a standard utility specification and maximisation, income supply 
depends on the slope and on virtual income y = y(1-v,r) . A tax change 
affects both v and r for a given individual, and income supply is affected 
according to 
 
 dy = - [δ y/δ (1-v)] dv + [δ y/δ r ]   d r .            ( 6 )  
 
This is rewritten  
 
dy = - β
u y [dv/(1-v)] + γ   d r ,              ( 7 )  
 
with β
u = [(1-v)/y][δ y/δ (1-v)] for the uncompensated elasticity of income 
with respect to the net of tax rate z, and γ  as the income effect parameter 
δ y/δ r. For the compensated elasticity of income β
c, which according to the 
Slutsky equation is β
c = β
u – (1-v) γ,  we can write (7) as 
 
dy / y = - β
c [dv/(1-v)] + γ  [(dr - y dv)/ y ]                  (8) 
 
Here dr-y dv is interpreted as the change in after-tax income due to a tax 
change for a given income y, it equals the change in tax liability.  
An empirical model found "natural" by Gruber & Saez (2002) is for 







clog([(1-uit2)/(1-uit1)]+γ log[(yit2-s(yit2))/(yit1-s(yit1))]+ε i, (9)   
 
where s(y) denotes the tax liability. Here an income effect is added; we find 
the dτ -terms in (3) specified as income net of tax, where the log ratio is an 
endogenous variable with γ  as the parameter.   
An instrumental variables' estimation is a reasonable procedure for the 
models. We will come back to estimation and the choice of instruments 
more generally later. The so-called natural instruments, according to some 
writers, are interesting to discuss here as one has let them influence model 
specification even. The natural instruments are log([(1-u'it1)/(1-uit1)] and 
log[(yit1-s'(yit1)/(yit1-s(yit1)] where u'it1 and s'(yit1) are obtained using the new 
tax system on (real) pre-reform income, that is these variables are based on 
predicted taxes for the new system in period t2 if real income does not 
change from t1. The second instrument may be correlated with the equation 
error  ε  and in an effort to purge the latter from the correlation, the 
suggestion is to include period t1 income, log(yit1), as a regressor. This is a 
subtle argument for the expanded model 
 
log(yit2/yit1)= β
c log([(1-uit2)/(1-uit1)]+γ  log[(yit2-s(yit2)/(yit1-s(yit1)]+ κ  
log(yit1)+ε i,                      ( 1 0 )  
 
A second argument put forward by some writers for a log(yit1)-term is, 
that this is a way to deal with bias due to mean reversion, that is that 
individuals with temporarily high pre reform income, in particular these 
one claims, will have decreased their income in the post reform period even 
if the marginal tax rates are lowered (Moffitt and Wilhelm (1998) , Auten 
and Carroll (2000), Gruber and Saez (2002)). 
In particular Moffitt and Wilhelm (1998) have a thorough discussion of 
estimation issues. More generally it is important to control for the base year 







4.   Swedish income taxation 1989-1999 
 
The reforms of income taxation in Sweden 1990-1991 were similar to the 
reforms in many other countries at the time; the tax base was broadened 
and tax rates were reduced, especially for higher income earners. The 
Swedish reforms also included more taxes on consumption, increased 
transfer payments and a modification of capital income taxation. By 1989, 
capital income was partly taxed together with labour income and interest 
payments could be deducted from labour income, to a large extent. After 
the reform, all interest payments were principally deductible against capital 
income only. A result of the changes was heavier taxation on housing and 
transportation. 
Swedish income taxes comprise municipal taxes and state taxes. The 
changes of the tax base due to the reform applied to both these taxes, while 
the changes in rates applied to the progressive state tax only. The maximal 
state rate was 42 percent before the reform 1990 to 1991, by 1992 the 
maximum was 20 percent. The municipal taxes are based on flat rates on 
income above a low threshold, the rate varied between 26.5 percent and 
34.4 percent 1997 for the inhabitants in different communities. Each 
community sets the rates annually, but a rate ranking of communities is 
fairly stable over time. For most income earners the municipal taxes 
constitute the larger part of the income taxes. 
The 1990-1991 reforms were not revenue neutral, increased labour 
supply was expected to compensate (some) revenue shortfall. Such an 
increase did not occur, Sweden experienced the biggest economic crises in 
decades and unemployment rose from below 2 percent 1988 and 1989 to 
almost 9 percent 1993. Public expenditure cuts followed and income taxes 
were raised again. A tax increase of 5 percent on higher income was intro-




5.   The data 
 
Our main database is the household income survey (HINK) of Statistics 
Sweden. Data on household structure, housing and details regarding 
employment are obtained by interviews in the survey, while data on income 





nal social insurance board, mainly. In the eighties the survey had a rotating 
panel design. Sampled individuals were included for two years and about 
half the sample was replaced each year. The number of households in the 
survey is about 10 000 each year and the number of adults about 16 000. 
The non-response rate for the interviews was about 15 to 20 percent.  
The sampling design is stratified with different selection probabilities for 
different strata. Due to the lack of a register of households in Sweden, the 
register of the total population is used as a sampling frame. Since all 
members of the households of the selected individuals are included in the 
survey, the sampling is also a type of network sampling. The calculation of 
precision of estimates requires formulas adapted to these circumstances. 
To enable evaluation of the 1990 to 1991 tax reform the panel design 
was changed by Statistics Sweden to include those in the 1988/1989 and 
1989/1990 panels in the 1992 sample. Register data for the years in 
between the waves and for 1993 to 1995 have also been collected. 
For calculation of marginal taxes, the tax-benefit micro-simulation 
system (FASIT) of Statistics Sweden and the Ministry of Finance was 
utilised. This system is developed for specially tailored databases of the 
household income survey. Here we had to adapt FASIT to our somewhat 
different databases and different years. With the databases and FASIT, 
taxable income is either known or is possible to calculate with high 
accuracy. Marginal rates are computed in a well-tested environment as 
regards tax rules and tax rates, the municipal tax rates are known for each 
community. Individual marginal rates are calculated comparing taxes 
before and after an increase in taxable income (or income from employ-




6.   Estimating the responses 
 
Our main variables are taxable income y=TI (”beskattningsbar inkomst”), 
with some differences in definition over time) and net of tax rate, z=NTR, 
the latter equals one minus the marginal tax rate, NTR = 1 – MTR or 1-u. 
In the analysis, the change in taxable income ∆ TI is compared to the 
change in the net of tax rate ∆ NTR, essentially. 
It is natural to use regression estimation for the analysis. We will start 
with the tabular alternative for averages used by Feldstein (1995). A tabular 





data and is easier to handle when a somewhat complicated sampling design 
has been used, as in the household income survey. Some tabular estimates 
may be obtained in a regression framework, as indicated in a previous 
section. After an introductory tabular estimation we will deepen the 
analysis with the help of regression considering some important changes in 
the model specification as well as changes in the selection of individuals 
for the analyses and changes in the estimation procedure.  
The tabular estimation utilises averages of ∆ TI and ∆ NTR. Three 
versions have been used (Moffit and Wilhelm 1998), differing by the 
specification of the averages used for the comparisons of two differently 
treated groups, say those with high income and those with low income, 
identified by superscripts H and L respectively. 
 
-I) A ratio of changes in arithmetic averages,  
 
 raI = [av(∆ TI
H) - av(∆ TI
L)] / [av(∆ NTR
H) - av(∆ NTR
L)], 
 
where av is the average operator av(z) = (1/n)Σ z. This is converted to an arc 
elasticity at the average income and average net of tax rate,  
 
 eI = raI [av(∆ NTR
H) + av(∆ NTR
L)] / [av(∆ TI




-II) A ratio of relative changes from percentages computed from average 
differences, 
 
eII = [av(∆ TI
H)/ av(TI
H
t1) - av(∆ TI
L)/ av(TI
L









where subscript t1 denotes the first time period, the ”before year”. 
 
 
-III) A ratio of differences as computed from average relative individual 
changes. 
 
eIII = [av(∆ TI
H/ TI
H
t1) - av(∆ TI
L/ TI
L









The first and the third of these ratios (I and III), but not the second (II), 





models, endogeneity has to be accounted for, as changes in income and 
changes in tax rate between the two years are jointly determined. 
Instrumental variables are an obvious alternative for estimation. Among 
basic instruments are dummy variables identifying groups treated 
differently by the tax reform; such variables are required as the only 
instruments, if the tabular estimates are to be mimicked. 
We will limit, here and later, the analysis to men aged 25 to 55 years to 
allow for comparison to earlier results and avoid some complications. 
Important for this restriction is that there were very few women among 
those with higher marginal rates 1988 in the database. Higher income 
individuals are essential to consider explicitly as a group, since those 
individuals are more affected by the changes in the marginal tax rates than 
those in other income brackets. 
 
 
7.   Results 
 
7.1   Tabular estimates 
The large Swedish income tax reform took place 1990 to 1991, meaning 
that the new system is in action from the income year of 1992. Let us start 
with a comparison of the pre-reform year 1989 to the post-reform year 
1992, using panel data from the household income survey, HINK. 
Table 1 shows, means and standard deviations for basic variables and 
four 1989 marginal tax groups. The chosen groups are rather distinct in the 
marginal tax rate distribution of our working ”prime-aged” men working at 
least 200 hours both years.  The selection by age and by working hours is 
identical to that of Moffit and Wilhelm (1998) for the US. Those with very 
low marginal rates, below 30 percent 1989, are not included in the tables. 
For Table 1 we can account for the stratified sampling design of the 
HINK survey, through the weights. In Tables 2 a-d we employ the 
Feldstein tabular method to estimate elasticities mainly to present the 
relevant variables and data. Here special formulas are required for the 
standard errors.   
15 
Table 1: Averages and standard deviations 1989 and 1992 for a panel of men aged 25-55 1989 with more 
than 200 hours of work both years by four marginal tax rate groups 1989. 
 
  Mean   Mean by marginal tax rate group 
(limits in percent)) 
Standard 
deviation  
Standard deviation by marginal tax rate 
group 












N number of observations      3711      900     1167     1165      479     3711      900     1167     1165      479 
Wage and salary 1989   153541  247743  161517  113588  53443.3  1303440  1257312   623764   741198   702796 
Wage and salary 1992   188987  297098  194163  144464  84554.5  1724537  1965445  1031186  1081730  1085086 
Earned income 1989   168859  263015  173994  129200  78847.0  1193994  1214963   407967   488010   550668 
Earned income 1992   206832  322855  208029  159190  111254  1757885  2147405   948570   939285  1044617 
Factor income 1989   170611  286061  171148  123676  76259.8  2068427  3387386   611433   541048   534033 
Factor  income  1992    215362 349706 214775 160592 110892  2340472  3359947  1382010  1031537  1044608 
Taxable income 92 (taxerad inkomst)  204262  319322  202047  158977  115253  1793775  2500747   793623   775530   919050 
Primary taxable income 89 (grundbelopp)  135478  222094  137153  102905  49599.7  1808011  3149817   407546   404958   319728 
Secondary tax.inc 89 (tilläggsbelopp)    159972 264440 161278 117833 70115.9  1885149  3154514  263804   388727   487761 
Taxable income 92 (beskattningsbar inkomst)    184405  298479  182425  139044 97092.5  1779019  2492308   782433   762858   875471 
Marginal rate 1989      0.57     0.72     0.62     0.48     0.36     1.90     0.22     0.22     0.23     0.27 
Marginal rate 1992      0.39     0.49     0.40     0.33     0.33     1.61     0.97     1.75     1.06     0.69 
Relative change in taxable income      0.25     0.17     0.13     0.22     1.04    24.80     7.11     4.63    19.28    59.79 
Relative change in net of tax rate     0.49     0.86     0.58     0.28     0.06     5.41     3.48     4.66     2.05     1.20 
Hours of work 1989   2 124  2 218  2 116  2 078  2 110  7 353  6 441  4 944  7 098  12 388 
Hours of work 1992   2 083  2 176  2 091  2 003  2 135  8 263  7 126  6 882  8 647  1 1281 
Age in 1989     39.50    42.08    39.79    38.18    37.31   135.44   104.94   143.25   145.76   119.99 
Household size 1989      2.78     3.02     2.83     2.55     2.87    23.26    19.96    24.14    24.71    21.74 
Household size 1989      2.78     3.02     2.83     2.55     2.87    23.26    19.96    24.14    24.71    21.74 
Household size 1992      2.78     2.89     2.81     2.62     3.01    22.78    19.39    23.69    24.47    21.34 
Changing household size, proportion       0.36     0.38     0.35     0.35     0.37     8.09     7.67     8.52     8.43     6.81 
No taxed wealth, proportion 1989        0.38     0.30     0.35     0.43     0.48     8.20     7.27     8.53     8.77     7.05 
Taxed wealth, log, those above lower limit.     7.18     8.41     7.48     6.43     6.01    96.90    89.52   100.33   101.01    83.21 
University degree, proportion      0.13     0.33     0.11     0.04     0.05     5.63     7.43     5.49     3.65     3.14 
Postgraduates, proportion      0.01     0.04     0.00     0.00     0.00     1.66     3.13     0.86     0.51     0.33 
Weights (unweighted)    284.80   249.45   318.84   313.38   198.77   148.53   113.60   131.64   167.56   147.41  
16 
Table  2a.     Average NTR (net of tax rate= 1-marginal tax rate 
(MTR)) and secondary taxable income (tilläggsbelopp) 1989 and 
1992 for different marginal tax rate groups 1989. 
 
 1989  1992 
Grp  n  1989  MTR  NTR Income NTR Income 
     Mean  s.e.  Mean  s.e. Mean s.e.  Mean  s.e. 
1  879  .67-  .276  .0005  263 367  7 150  .511  .0022  299 959  6 824 
2  1 166  .56-.67  .382  .0004  162 187  559  .595  .0031  185 902  1 453 
3  1 163  .45-.56  .481  .0004  117 385  664  .664  .0020  139 084  1 405 
4  503  .30-.45  .598  .0006  77 696  1 983  .671  .0025  106 002  3 133 
 
From Table 2a, we find that the marginal tax rates on average were about 
0.72 (1-0.276) for the top group (group 1) and about 0.40 for the bottom 
group for 1989. Average income in the top group in 1989 is 263 000 and 77 
000 in the bottom group. 
The income concept here is taxable income 1992 and extended taxable 
income (tilläggsbelopp) 1989. The latter is more comparable to taxable 
income 1992 than the 1989 primary taxable income (grundbelopp) where 
interest payments had been deducted. The income distribution as indicated 
by group averages shows that the averages for the non-top groups 2, 3 and 
4 were about 62, 45 and 29 percent, respectively, of the average income for 
the top group 1989 which comprise about 20 percent of the individuals in 
these comparisons.  
In the leftmost columns of Table 2b, we see that the decrease in marginal 
tax rate, after the reform, is about 0.24 for the top group and about 0.07 for 
the bottom group. This means the marginal tax rates 1992 had fallen to 
about 0.49 and 0.34 for the two groups respectively; these rates are easily 




Table 2b.   Differences (changes) 1992-1989. 
 
Change of average  Relative change of average  Relative individual change  
NTR Income  NTR Income  NTR  Income 
 
 
Group  Est.  Se  Est.  Se  Est. Se Est.  Se Est.  Se  Est. Se 
1  .235  .002  35 592  9 224  .853  .008  .135  .038  .855  .008  .178  .020 
2  .213  .003  23 714  1 302  .557  .008  .146  .008  .559  .008  .147  .008 
3  .183  .002  21 699  1 316  .381  .004  .185  .012  .381  .004  .250  .036 







Table 2c. Differences of differences (d-o-d), average change, 
group 1 compared to other groups 
 
Grps  NTR  Income  NTR  Income NTR Income 
comp.  Est.  Se  Est.  Se Est.  Se Est. Se Est. se Est. se 
1-2  .022 .004  11  878  9  316 .296 .012  -.012 .038  .296 .012  .031 .022 
1-3  .052 .003  13  893  9  318 .472 .009  -.050 .039  .473 .009  -.072 .041 
1-4  .163 .003  7  286  9  695 .732 .009  -.230 .056  .733 .009  -.762 .203 
 
The relative change for the averages up to 1992 was largest for the bottom 
group, an increase of 36 percent, nominally. If individual relative changes 
are averaged instead, the result is 94 percent due to some extreme 
increases; the latter figure is also accompanied by a much larger standard 
error. Income increases for the groups do not generally correspond to 
similar changes in purchasing power, however, the consumer price index 
increased from 1989 to 1992 by 23 percent.  
Let us go to table 2c, where we find differences of differences, or 
differences of changes 1992-1989 to be more precise. The larger increase 
in NTR for the top group, as compared to the other groups, is accompanied 
by insignificant differences in taxable income change, with exception for 
relative change and the top/bottom (or 1-4) comparison, where a negative 
effect is found implying a disadvantage for the top group. 
For the elasticities in Table 2d, results are similar with significant 
negative effects only for the top/bottom comparisons based on relative 
changes. One might suspect that this depends on the bottom group 
containing a number of men not working full-time the whole year. How-
ever, an increase of the minimum number of working hours to 500 first, 
and then to 1 000 and 2 000 as a condition to be included in the analysis did 
not change conclusions. Also, a definition of groups by TI 1989 (taxable 
income) instead of MTR (marginal tax rate) 1989 gives similar results. 
 




# Based  on  relative 
change
## 




compared  Est.  Se Est.  Se  Est. Se 
1 with 2  4.040  2.8204  -.039  .1293  .105  .0745 
1 with 3  1.958  1.0454  -.106  .0825  -.152  .0866 
1 with 4  .216  .2623  -.314  .0758  -1.038  .2771 
# arc elasticity, for example 4.040=(11878/.022)*(.235+.213)/(35592+23714) 





Inflation means that income changes are different whether taxable income 
is in constant or current prices. Elasticities based on taxable income 
differences are affected and since inflation was high - the consumer price 
index increased by 23 percent from 1989 to 1992 - results may differ. 
However, elasticities based on relative changes of yearly averages are 
easily transformed from constant to current price versions. It is easy to 
show that estimates are identical if all changes still are positive (or 
negative) after a transformation to constant prices, but if some individual 
changes change sign by a transformation, elasticities may be affected. This 
has only minor effects here, later we will consider a log model in constant 
prices. 
 
7.2   A simple regression model 
In Table 3, the analysis is brought further with the help of regression. The 
main parameter corresponds to the third type of elasticity, based on relative 
individual change above. Regression analysis is also possible as regards 
absolute change, the first alternative with arc elasticity, but not for the 
second type of elasticity. The regression framework enables us to examine 
the results more closely as regards the importance of potentially disturbing 
factors, different groups for the comparison of changes, different selections 
of individuals for the analysis and different instruments for the estimation.  
For any pair of two groups used in the comparisons in Table 2a-d and a 
dummy variable identifying those groups as an instrument, the point 
estimates there should be reproduced, and indeed we obtain 0.105 in the 
first row in table 3 for the two higher income groups. The variances differ; 
standard IV formulas were used for the regression estimates, this is 
disputable for a stratified sample. The standard error is understated, the 
estimate is 0.055 now compared to 0.075 earlier in Table 2d, this can be 
taken as an indication that significant results in our regression estimation 
for the household income survey should be interpreted with care. 
In the following, we will see whether the obtained estimates hold for 
changes in the definitions of the different comparison groups and changes 
in the estimation procedure. The marginal rates for inclusion in the 
comparison groups are changed, the limit in yearly working hours is 
changed, comparison groups are defined by income, stable households with 
respect to the number of children and marital status are examined and the 





In Table 3 then, we first examine the effects of including individuals with 
midrange marginal rates 1989 as well as the effects of excluding 
individuals with working hours below 1 000 and 2 000 yearly hours, 
respectively, both years. The tendency is a smaller coefficient when the 
hours restriction is tightened; when individuals with lower 1989 marginal 
taxes are included the coefficient becomes negative and significant at a 5 
percent level. That effect is verified by section C in the table where only 
stratum 4 in the survey is considered, thus the problems of variance calcu-
lation for a stratified sampling design is avoided (similar results are obtain-
ed when stratum dummies are included, this is sometimes an acceptable 
remedy; results are not shown). 
Next, let us consider that the reform basically changed the state tax rate 
and thus only indirectly the total marginal tax rate (MTR). The municipal 
rates included in MTR may vary with as much as almost 8 percentage 
points for different communities, consequently the MTR for an individual 
with a given income may be larger than for an individual with higher 
income. MTR therefore lacks precision when used to identify individuals 
treated differently by the reform. A second difficulty is that the MTR may 
change considerably for individuals moving.  
Since the identification of individuals treated differently by the reform is 
the key in a quasi-experimental evaluation of our kind, it is essential to 
examine the effects of this lacking precision. To this end, a grouping 
according to the extended taxable income (“tilläggsbelopp”) is used for 
sections D-F. Preferably, we would like to define groups exactly according 
to the changes of the reform. But let us begin with a simple grouping into 
four groups with taxable income of 20 000 to 100 000 SEK, 100 000 to 140 
000, 140 000 to 200 000 and 200 000 and more.  
The result is, as before, a negative significant effect when all groups are 
considered, but when the two top groups only are used (the first row) the 
effect is positive and the p-value for the coefficient is 0.022 as compared to 
0.054 for section A, the first row. When all four groups are considered but 
only the first is identified by a dummy variable in the first stage, then the 
negative effect seems to vanish (the third row); an increase in the coeffi-
cient for such an instrumentation is consistent with results of Moffitt & 
Wilhelm (1998).  
We have pointed out the complication of the two tax bases 1989, which 
makes the elasticity a combined effect. Let us try to shed some light on this 
problem by considering those with the same taxable income according to 





Table 3: Regression estimates of effects of tax rate changes on 
taxable income changes 1992-1989 with alternative regressors 




     n    Instrumental 
variables
”” 
    Second stage  
∆ NTR 
  First  
stage  
A: MTR classes, .30-45, .45-55, .55- 67, .67-         Coeff.          s. e.         R
2 
>200, >.56  2 036    1 MTR   .105  .055  .25 
>1000, ”  2 004    1 MTR  .097  .055  .25 
>2000, ”  1 662     1 MTR  .060  .047  .26 
>200, >.45  3 166     2 MTR  -.128  .064  .53 
>200, >.30  3 690    3 MTR  -.601  .100  .62 
>1000, ”  3 531     3 MTR  -.178  .037  .61 
>2000, ”  2 04    3 MTR  -.185  .041  .60 
B: A and no change family size or cohabiting status 
>200, >.56  1 294    1 MTR  .053  .070  .25 
>200, >.30  2 345    3 MTR  -.483  .119  .62 
>1000, ”  2 255    3 MTR  -.176  .044  .61 
C: A and  Stratum 4 only 
>200, >.56  1 355    1 MTR  .135  .076  .21 
>200, >.30  2 418    3 MTR  -.675  .111  .58 
>1000, ”  2 293    3 MTR  -.164  .040  .57 
D: Income groups 20-100,100-140,140-200,200- 
>200,>140’  2 076    1 Inc  .160  .070  .15 
>200, >20’  3 636    1 Inc  -.018  .044  .26 
>200, >20’  3 636    3 Inc  -.180  .031  .52 
>1000, ”  3 491    3 Inc  -.135  .029  .51 
D1: D and taxbases identical (no deductions for interest payments) 
>200,>140’   160    1  Inc  .123 .248  .09 
>200, >20’   606    3 Inc  -.574  .124  .60 
E: D 
>200,>140’  2 076    1 Inc 1 MTR  .105  .052  .27 
>200, >20’  3 636    1 Inc 1 MTR  -.154  .028  .61 
>1000, ”  3 491    1 Inc 1 MTR  -.114  .026  .61 
F: D and variables: 5 age dummies, cohabiting status, change family size, change cohabiting status 
>200,>140’  2 076  1 Inc 1 MTR  .101  .052  .28 
>200, >20’  3 636  3 Inc 3 MTR  -.135  .029  .62 
>1000, ”  3 491  3 Inc 3 MTR  -.104  .027  .61 
G: F and Stratum 4 only 
>200,>140’  1 378    1 Inc 1 MTR  .140  .072 .23 
>200, >20’  2 397    3 Inc 3 MTR  -.177  .037  .58 
H: State marginal tax rate (SMTR) classes (rates according to both taxbases added) 
>200,SMTR>=.33 1 972   Smtr=31, 42  1 SMTR  .100  .056  .25 
>200,SMTR>=.22 3 056  Smtr=21 25 30 31 42 4 SMTR  -.027  .028  .53 
H1: H and extraplanatory variables: log(wealth), higher education dummies 
>200,SMTR>=31  3 056  Smtr=21 25 30 31 42 4 SMTR   -.065  .028  .54 
I: H and not changing municipality 
>200,SMTR>=31  1 866   Smtr=31, 42  1 SMTR  .096  .058  .25 
>200,SMTR>=21  2 875  Smtr=21 25 30 31 42 4 SMTR   -.032  .029  .52 
# This column indicates the selection of individuals for estimation. The first inequality 





years. The second inequality shows the marginal tax rate requirement for 1989 when the 
number is a fraction, but for a number like 140’ the requirement is on taxable income 
for 1989, 140’ meaning that at least 140 000 Skr is required. 
## MTR classes or income classes are identified by dummy variables. The MTR classes 
are those of table 2. The notation ”1 MTR” means that a dummy for the highest MTR 
class only is used, ”2 MTR” means two dummies for the two highest MTR classes and 
so forth. There is a similar notation for income classes (1 Inc, 3 Inc etcetera). The 
explanatory variables for each specification are also used as instruments. 
 
section D1 results for these individuals, who on the average have higher 
income and are older, are shown. Only 10 to 20 percent of the individuals 
remain after this selection. A negative effect is again the result when 
individuals from all four marginal tax groups are included. 
In the following sections of the table, we first strengthen instruments by 
using dummies for both income classes and MTR-groups. Weak 
instruments, with low explanatory power in a first stage means a larger risk 
of bias; there may be a bias in the direction of the ordinary least squares 
estimator
2. Results for ”all”, in section E and for stratum 4 only in section 
G are calculated with the same conclusions as before.  
In section F we introduce dummies for age classes (25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 
40-44, 45-49, 50-54), for family type (cohabiting or not) and for change in 
the number of children; changes in results are small.  
In section H, state marginal tax rate groups are defined after both 1989 
tax bases. That is, a cross-classification of income according to both 
definitions is used for a grouping of individuals. First we select those with 
the resulting rates of 31 and 42 percent, thereafter those with rates 21, 25 
and 30 percent are added. The results with the corresponding dummy 
variables are that the coefficient is close to zero and non-significant, earlier 
it was negative. Addition of log wealth in the household (as stated to the 
tax authorities), a dummy for those with no wealth according to their in-
come (and wealth) statements, and dummies for those with higher educa-
tion (university at least three years, and postgraduate studies) has little 
effect, although a small coefficient is doubled.  
There are small changes also if those moving to another community 
1989-1992 are excluded in the estimation, section I. As is seen the per-
centage moving is small, about 5 to 6 percent. There are practical diffi-
culties to treat change of community endogenously, good instrumental 
variables seem difficult to find.  
                                                            





The results so far show basically non-significant or negative effects, the 
latter when those with lower income are included. There are indications of 




7.3.   Examination of an extended model 
Next, we will examine a log model with an income effect and pre-reform 
income (for 1989) as possible additional variables according to model (10). 
We will also analyse the importance of different income concepts. Beside 
taxable income the different income variables are as follows, ranging from 
narrow to wide income concepts: wages plus salaries, earned income, factor 
income, earned income combined with income from capital to a varying extent. 
  Estimation results for these alternatives are summarised in Tables 4, 5 
and 6. The selection of individuals and the choice of instruments vary row-
wise, in the same way as in Table 3 before, so that rows A1 and A3 in 
tables 4 and 5 correspond to the first and third rows in section A in Table 3.  
Instrumental variables are used for the estimation with instruments as in 
table 3 including the ”natural instruments” based on predicted post-reform 
taxes and no income change -according to section 3- and in logarithms. 
Table 4 gives estimates of income elasticities for a model with the 
restrictions γ =κ =0, that is a zero income effect and a zero effect of pre-
reform income. The main column for differences in taxable income, 
according to the same concepts as in earlier tables, is highlighted. 
Significant estimates on a 5 percent level are marked with stars.  
Almost half the estimates are negatively significant in the first part; for 
the baseline model. These results are generally obtained when those with 
lower tax rates 1989 are included in the estimation.  Positive significant 
estimates are obtained in the last column with a large difference in the 
income variables’ specifications; basically all positive capital income is 
included 1992 but only net capital income 1989, the latter is pre-reform 







Table 4. Income elasticities 1992-1989, different income 
variables and selections of individuals. Log variables, baseline 
model (γ=κ= 0).  
 
    Estimates, different income variables
3 
Model N














A1  2094  0.089   0.151*  -.120   0.024   0.161   1.828* 
A3  1705  0.045   0.097   -.101   0.021   0.156   1.772* 
A4  3206  -.160*  -.012   -.125*  -.114*  0.032   1.778* 
A5  3648  -.317*  -.137*  -.248*  -.267*  -.333*  1.855* 
A7  2876  -.266*  -.068*  -.159*  -.120*  -.174*  1.920* 
B1  1327  -.118   0.043   -.199*  -.026   0.059   1.561* 
C1  1400  0.101   0.177   -.072   0.022   0.192   1.748* 
C2  2407  -.346*  -.223*  -.311*  -.355*  -.411*  1.560* 
D1  2105  0.117   0.095   -.168   0.096   0.000   1.736* 
D2  3607  -.113*  -.017   -.139*  -.083*  -.233*  1.641* 
D11   166  0.372   0.370   0.293   -.062   -.062   1.259* 
D12   595  -.499*  -.195   -.277*  -.208   -.208   1.965* 
E1  2105  0.065   0.058   -.192*  0.044   -.012   1.697* 
F1  2105  0.039   0.047   -.197*  0.014   -.070   1.624* 
F2  3607  -.218*  -.058   -.176*  -.127*  -.218*  1.593* 
G1  1405  0.058   0.056   -.164   0.024   -.023   1.540* 
G2  2390  -.233*  -.137*  -.243*  -.208*  -.279*  1.379* 
H1  2070  0.069   0.142   -.107   0.032   0.160   1.835* 
H2  3167  -.125*  0.052   -.064   -.095*  0.100*  1.556* 
H12  3167  -.172*  -.017   -.132*  -.153*  0.060   1.388* 
I1  1958  0.036   0.133   -.113   0.024   0.154   1.812* 
I2  2979  -.130*  0.037   -.105*  -.087*  0.104*  1.559* 
* significant on a 5 percent level 
 
In Table 5, where the parameters γ  and κ  are free and estimated, positive 
and significant effects are dominating. For the main comparison there 
generally is a positive income elasticity ranging from 0.2 to 0.4. This result 
holds even when those with lower income are included, compare A1 and 
A5 for example. That the results here for the different models are 
concordant to this extent is quite a contrast to what we have found earlier. 
The only exceptions are rows D11 and D12 for those with identical tax 
                                                            
3 Variables are denoted as follows. Wage+salary for the HINK-variables illont 1989 and 
tlon 1992, earned income for isarb 1989, carb 1992, factor income for isfakt 1989 and 
cfakt 1992, taxable income for ssbeskb or sundtb 1989 and cbefvi 1992, combined 
earned income and income from capital for issam (1989) ctxfvi+kkap (1992) 
4 For the estimates in the highlighted column. 
5 Deductions for interest payments allowed 1989. 





bases, that is those with no interest deductions and probably not many with 
high income.  
For the different income variables, that is when estimates are ranked by 
income definition or column-wise, we find that the effect gradually 
becomes smaller the more we diverge from taxable income, that is as we go  
 
Table 5. Income elasticities 1992-1989, different income 
variables and selections of individuals. Log variables, extended 
model (γ≠ 0, κ  ≠ 0.) 
 

















A1  2094  0.146   0.240*  0.393*  0.411*  0.095*   0.506* 
A3  1705  0.145   0.181*  0.314*  0.287*  0.107*   0.305* 
A4  3206  0.231*  0.359*  0.439*  0.364*  0.140*   0.020  
A5  3648  0.280*  0.403*  0.479*  0.430*  0.185*   0.088  
A7  2876  0.171*  0.222*  0.374*  0.219*  0.174*   -.272* 
B1  1327  -.014   0.140   0.208*  0.211*  0.108*   0.235* 
C1  1400  0.162   0.254*  0.415*  0.418*  -.039    0.531* 
C2  2407  0.268*  0.347*  0.399*  0.384*  0.098*   0.406* 
D1  2105  0.207*  0.332*  0.318*  0.361*  0.114*   0.550* 
D2  3607  0.143*  0.225*  0.278*  0.275*  0.167*   0.383* 
D11   166  0.400   0.251   0.295   0.025   0.025    0.107  
D12   595  0.397   0.401   0.603*  -.013   -.013    0.036  
E1  2105  0.138   0.302*  0.316*  0.354*  0.111*   0.506* 
F1  2105  0.116   0.288*  0.308*  0.324*  0.105*   0.492* 
F2  3607  0.093*  0.230*  0.336*  0.225*  0.096*   0.337* 
G1  1405  0.137   0.312*  0.323*  0.344*  0.007    0.512* 
G2  2390  0.095   0.196*  0.304*  0.241*  0.065*   0.336* 
H1  2070  0.149*  0.212*  0.346*  0.413*  0.092*   0.498* 
H2  3167  0.087   0.190*  0.319*  0.237*  0.130*   0.269* 
H12  3167  0.085   0.186*  0.301*  0.221*  0.134*   0.249* 
I1  1958  0.115   0.229*  0.336*  0.403*  0.094*   0.497* 
I2  2979  0.063   0.142*  0.278*  0.235*  0.135*   0.258* 
* significant on a 5 percent level 
 
 
                                                            
7 Variables are denoted as follows. Wage+salary for the HINK-variables illont 1989 and 
tlon 1992, earned income for isarb 1989, carb 1992, factor income for isfakt 1989 and 
cfakt 1992, taxable income for ssbeskb or sundtb 1989 and cbefvi 1992, combined 
earned income and income from capital for issam (1989) ctxfvi+kkap (1992) 
8 For the estimates in the highlighted column. 
9 Deductions for interest payments allowed 1989. 





to the left from the main column. Thus the effect is smaller for factor 
income than for taxable income, still smaller for earned income and 
smallest for the most narrow income concept; wages and salaries
11. For the 
two rightmost columns, where income from capital is treated differently for 
the two years, we find that the estimates are lower when net capital income 
is largely deducted 1989 but not 1992 (the second last column) and higher 
when positive capital income is included 1992 but only net capital income 
1989 (the last column).  
It is interesting to see how the large differences between these columns 
in the first section are considerably reduced in the second section, an 
illustration of how the additional variables help against yearly measurement 
differences similar to mean reversion problems; capital income is 
accounted for to different extents for the two years.  
The estimates for the parameters γ  and κ  of the additional variables used 
for Table 5, as well as the effects of different combinations of these vari-
ables are shown in Table 6. We find that the important variable for the 
change in the elasticity estimate is pre-reform income. When this variable 
is included a significant and positive elasticity estimate is obtained. The 
coefficient for pre-reform income is negative, but the estimate is imprecise  
 
Table 6. Parameter estimates and standard errors 1992-1989 for 
different versions of A1 tables 4 and 5, with and without income 
effect or pre-reform income. 
 
  Base (γ =κ =0)  (γ ≠ 0, κ =0) (γ =0, κ ≠ 0)   (γ ≠ 0, κ ≠ 0) 
Variable est.  s.e. est. s.e.  est. s.e.  est.  s.e. 
                
Constant -.121    -.121    2.91   2.601   
   (.044)    (.044)    (.413)    (.320) 
∆ NTR  .024   .022    .534    .412   
   (.083)    (.085)    (.108)    (.086) 
Inc.-eff.       .008        .272  
       (.086)        (.059) 
Preref. inc          -.271     -.245   
           (.036)    (.028) 
n  2 094    2 094    2 094    2 094   
rmse 6.09    6.04    6.76    5.11   
                                                            
11 It should be noted though that the number of individuals not necessarily is constant 
across columns. Individuals with non-positive income net of tax according to the actual 
definition are excluded, this applies also for the instruments. Thus, there is a smaller 
variation of individuals column-wise. A limitation to those with positive income 





according to collinearity diagnostics. The income effect is positive for the 
full model in the last columns. The standard error or 0.086 for elasticity 
estimate in the complete model probably understates precision a bit. This 
income effect implies a difference between the uncompensated and the 
compensated elasticity, a difference not found by Gruber and Saez (2002). 
Let us summarise results for the 1989 to 1992 estimation. A more 
standard difference in difference estimation gives somewhat different 
results mainly depending on whether those in the lower income brackets 
are included or not. Generally, it seems difficult to establish a positive 
elasticity. For the extended model, on the other hand, a consistent picture is 
obtained with a (smaller) elasticity in the interval 0.2 to 0.4 for taxable 
income. For the other income variables as consistently defined over time as 





Utilising the large tax reform 1990 to 1991, we obtain a central elasticity 
estimate between 0.2 and 0.4, for prime-aged men. This result is for the 
extended model with income for the pre-reform year included as an expla-
natory variable.  
For a simpler more standard specification without pre-reform income, 
effects are difficult to establish: estimates are either non-significant or 
negative. Negative effects are found when those in the lowest income 
group are included in the estimation.  
The use of income for the pre-reform year as a covariate has alterna-
tively been suggested for treating mean reversion bias, that is, the effects of 
some individuals by extra ordinary circumstances, unrelated to the reform, 
obtaining a high income for one year. Generally estimates are increased 
after such inclusion (Moffit & Wilhelm 1998, Aarbu & Thoresen 2001) but 
the extent to which bias actually is removed and other estimation problems 
not introduced is unclear. There is scarce evidence that such inclusion is the 
general remedy for mean reversion problems. Simple simulation experi-
ments cast doubts on the effects.  
Our estimates and those of Aarbu and Thoresen (2001) for Norway are 
smaller than what has been found in most American studies. This 
difference is in line with the idea that more egalitarian societies will have 





our compensated elasticity is lower than the uncompensated elasticity, due 
to the positive income effect (table 6). This is in contrast to the similarity 
between these two elasticities found by Gruber and Saez (2002). The 
income dispersions in Sweden and Norway are among the lowest for the 
industrial countries and in contrast to the U.S., with Canada in between 
(Förster 2000). Elasticity estimates obtained from Canada are not in be-
tween, they are also low, however. Sillamaa and Veall (2001) comment on 
the difference only by paraphrasing Slemrod (1998), that different tax 
systems may have different elasticities. Sillamaa and Veall, with an im-
presssive sample size, get larger elasticities for high-income individuals. 
An increased responsiveness accompanying larger income is also observed 
by Gruber and Saez (2002), among others, and a similar tendency is found here. 
A trend in inequality may affect results. From the beginning of the 
eighties there has been a gradual increase in income inequality in Sweden.
12 
Accounting for the underlying trend in the income distribution would 
probably shift our estimates somewhat downwards, due to a difference in 
income change not driven by the reform. 
Adjustments for tax-base changes were not made in our estimations; 
observed income was used for both years. Consequently, estimated 
elasticities depend on a mixture of changes in rates and in tax bases. 
Adjustments of the tax base for either year are somewhat speculative since 
information is incomplete in the database regarding the affected items.  
Earlier multiplier-based adjustments for tax-base changes indicate a 
larger effect in the top of the income distribution, but small differences for 
broader income groups.
13 After adjustments, the 90
th percentile was 5.6 
percent higher than before, while the median was 2.5 percent larger and the 
10
th percentile 1.5 percent larger than originally as regards earned income 
for the pre-reform year, 1989. Average income is increased by about 4 
percent for men in main socio-economic classes. The new broader tax base 
result in a somewhat higher Gini-coefficient, the estimate is 0.185 instead 
of 0.178 for 1989.  
An idea of the results for the broader tax base both years is obtained 
using the tabular estimation in section 3. Let us consider the ratio of 
differences eIII. A change in tax base affects average income changes, the 
numerator, but not average net of tax rate changes, the denominator. 
Suppose we are comparing a high-income group with a middle-income 
group. In Table 2, the high-income group includes about 22 percent of the 
                                                            
12 Income distribution survey different years, Statistics Sweden. 





individuals and using the 90
th percentile as an indicator of income change 
due to the base broadening 1988, average income increases by about 5 
percent. For the middle group the change in median by 2.5 percent is taken 
to indicate average income change. Straightforward algebra then shows 
basically, a negative factor, which decreases the numerator and thus the 
effects. The group difference (high-income group – middle income group) 
in relative income increase is reduced by roughly 0.023. 
Changes in income are affected by the business cycle. As pointed out in 
the introduction, Sweden experienced a recession in the beginning of the 
nineties, following a period with very low unemployment rates for all 
workers. For the difference-in-differences approach, this is critical to the 
extent that different income groups are affected differently, but not 
necessarily otherwise. Labour market data shows that unemployment did 
not hit those with university education as much as those with less 
education. (Labour force surveys, Statistics Sweden).  
In our tables, indications of the effects of these differences are obtained 
comparing estimates for different restrictions on the number of yearly 
working hours. Thus in Table 4, rows A3 and A7 show results for those 
with more than 2 000 working hours both 1989 and 1992. For the extended 
model in section 2, estimates decrease with these restrictions. For the main 
taxable income variables there is a decrease from about 0.4 for all those 
with more than 200 hours to 0.2 – 0.3 for those with more than 2 000 hours 
(row A3 compared to A1, A7 compared to A5).  Effects for the baseline 
model are more mixed ranging from almost no effect (A3 compared to A1) 
to a smaller negative effect (A7 compared to A5) 
Summing up: the complications here point in the negative direction and 
the already modest effect of 0.2 to 0.4 therefore seems an upper bound for 
the elasticity. Similarly to studies for other countries, we have found that 
results are sensitive to the choice of income concept and the choice of 
individuals to include along the income scale. The highest effects are 
obtained for taxable income as used for taxation and likewise when 
individuals in the higher income classes only are considered. Negative 
effects appear when those in the lowest income class are included.  
For the period examined here a large reform and a slump in the labour 
market coincided. It is not obvious that the effects for smaller reforms are 
similar to those for larger reforms, and it is probably more difficult to 
control for disturbing factors during rapidly changing macro-economic 
conditions than otherwise. The feasibility of the results is best examined by 
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